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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Opposition Brief ("Opposition") Appellee Brittney Fenn ("Fenn") filed 
ignores the Record. The only contacts Appellant Mleads Enterprises, Inc. ("Mleads") 
had with Utah was a single email Ms. Fenn fortuitously accessed in Utah. The Record 
is uncontroverted that Mleads did not intend for any message to be transmitted to any 
Utah resident and Mleads could not have known that Ms. Fenn would review the 
single email in Utah. This case presents the Utah Supreme Court an opportunity to 
hold that due process of law and personal jurisdiction in the Internet age is still a 
meaningful bar to being haled into court in a foreign jurisdiction based upon random 
and fortuitous events. 
Faced with the most minimal jurisdictional facts, Ms. Fenn resorts to 
speculation outside the Record about Mleads's other business operations and what 
Mleads would have done had Ms. Fenn responded to the single email. The Court's 
review is properly restricted to the Record and to the findings below1. For the first 
time in this lawsuit, Ms. Fenn argues that she should have been allowed to conduct 
additional discovery regarding Mleads's activities unrelated to the lawsuit. These 
arguments were not raised below and were not designated as issues on Ms. Fenn's 
'Ms. Fenn's Opposition repeatedly refers to "findings" of the Court of Appeals. 
This is improper. A Court of Appeals makes conclusions of law and any findings of 
fact were made by the trial court. 
1 
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Ms. Fenn's speculations are not properly 
before the court. 
Mleads did not aim its communications to the State of Utah or to any of its 
residents. The Court of Appeals' "single email rule" renders any protection for 
personal jurisdiction illusory and creates a dangerous precedent. Consequently, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Ms. FENN MISSTATES THE RECORD ON THE ISSUE OF PURPOSEFUL INTENT 
Ms. Fenn argues the e-mail at issue "was sent directly to a . . . a specific 
location . . . in Utah." (Opposition, p. 14.)2 In truth, Mleads caused an email to be sent 
to an address which, unbeknownst to Mleads, a Utah resident accessed. The e-mail in 
question was addressed to Brittney Fenn at <BAF@heartslc.com>. Ms. Fenn's email 
address - like every email address - is location neutral. An email address alone does 
not reveal the location at which messages sent to it will be viewed. Indeed, the trial 
court concluded "Mleads had no knowledge, prior to the email being sent. . . that a 
solicitation would be directed to a resident of [the State of Utah]." (Record, p. 88.) 
2
 Ms. Fenn also notes that "[t]he e-mail was . . . addressed to and received by a 
Utah resident," (Opposition, p. 15), and that Mleads "sent an . . . email directly to a 
Utah resident." (Opposition, p. 12; see also Opposition, p. 13 ("[Mleads] sent one 
[message] directly to Ms. Fenn in Sandy, Utah"); Opposition, p. 12 ("Mleads . . . 
delivered the offending email to Ms. Fenn's home computer"),.) 
2 
The Court of Appeals reiterated "Mleads did not know specifically that the agent 
would send an email to Fenn or to any Utah resident." (See Court of Appeals Decision, 
at *P2 (emphasis added).) Courts uniformly recognize that the sender of an email 
cannot control the location at which the email may be viewed. An "e-mail [can be] 
retrieved from anywhere in the world." Kaempe v. Myers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18386 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Hydro Eng'g. Inc. v. Landa. Inc.. 
231 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (D. Utah 2002) (citing Kaempe for the same proposition). 
Thus, the unequivocal facts in the Record are that Mleads did not purposefully direct 
any messages to the State of Utah. 
Ms. Fenn speculates that Mleads "certainly can require information regarding 
the location of the main residence for potential recipients prior to sending out their 
emails . . . It would not take much to do so." (Opposition, p. 13.) This argument 
ignores that an email address is not location-specific. Ms. Fenn does not, and cannot, 
explain how Mleads could have translated <BAF@heartslc.com> to reveal the location 
of her main residence. 
Ms. Fenn's argument also is contrary to the findings below. As the trial court 
found, the third party marketing company hired by Mleads did not provide "any 
personal or contact information about [Ms. Fenn] prior to the transmission of the [e-
mail] nor would have provided such information even if requested by Mleads/' 
(Record, p. 88.) Even if the Internet permitted emails to be viewed only in select 
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locations, the Record is uncontroverted that the single email was sent by a third party 
marketing company which did not (and would not) communicate the location of the 
recipient of the email. Ms. Fenn's unsupported conclusion that "it would not take 
much to" "require information regarding the location of the main residence for 
potential recipients prior to sending out their emails" should be disregarded. 
Ms. Fenn has not cited any fact in the Record indicating Mleads knew or could 
have known the "main residence" of the account holder of <BAF(5)heartslc.com>. 
The Record in this case is clear that Mleads had no knowledge of Ms. Fenn's state of 
residence and that the only jurisdictional facts at bar are a single location-neutral email 
address. 
B. Ms. FENN IMPROPERLY SPECULATES ABOUT EVIDENCE NOT IN THE RECORD 
The Opposition is filled with speculation and presumption about what Mleads 
could have been doing. For example, Ms. Fenn argues Mleads "hired a Florida based 
company to send . . . emails, presumably all over the country." (Opposition, p. 14.) 
Ms. Fenn further opines that while the total number of e-mails is not known they 
"probably number at least in the tens-of-thousands," (Opposition, p. 14) and that 
"[t]he solicitation would be and probably has been sent to computer terminals all over 
the world, including to other Internet users in Utah." (Opposition, p. 18.) Ms. 
Fenn's speculations ignore this Court's pronouncement that "[the Court's] power of 
review is strictly limited to the record presented on appeal.... Parties claiming error 
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below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to support their 
allegations with an adequate record." Gorostieta v. Parkinson. 2000 UT 99, PI5 (Utah 
2000). The Court should disregard Ms. Fenn's speculations regarding Mleads's 
alleged other contacts with the State of Utah because they are unsupported by any 
facts in the Record or citations thereto. 
C. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES "SOMETHING MORE" THAN PLACING PRODUCTS OR 
EMAILS IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE 
Ms. Fenn analogizes to cases involving products released into the stream of 
commerce and cases involving interactive web sites. (See, e.g., Opposition, p. 11 
(citing Asahi Metal Indus Co.. Ltd. v. Superior Court. 480 U.S. 102, 107 (1987)); 
Opposition p. 17 (citing iAccess, Inc. v. WEBcard Techs., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 
1187 (D. Utah 2002)). These cases are unavailing. In effect, Ms. Fenn argues merely 
marketing over the Internet is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on a defendant. 
Courts have summarily rejected arguments that the advent of the Internet renders 
decades of due process jurisprudence moot. With the Internet, as with every other 
means of communication, there must be "something more" to comport to 
constitutional due process. 
Ms. Fenn's reliance on "stream of commerce" authority does not support the 
proposition Ms. Fenn proffers. Due process jurisprudence, including the cases Ms. 
Fenn cites, consistently provides that merely injecting a product into the stream of 
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commerce is not sufficient to support jurisdiction: 
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is 
not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. 
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to 
serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for 
the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing 
channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or 
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the 
sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant's awareness that the stream 
of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not 
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act 
purposefully directed toward the forum State. 
Asahi Metal Indus Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 (1987) (emphasis 
added) (quoted at Opposition, p. 11). Ms. Fenn relies on the "additional conduct" 
analysis in Asahi and speculates that the additional conduct is present here. However, 
the Record is absent any facts of such additional conduct. Moreover, the basic 
principle of Asahi is controlling: merely placing a product in the stream of commerce 
is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Applying Asahi to the present case, the 
single email Ms. Fenn received is insufficient to hale Mleads into court in Utah. 
The operation of an Internet website can constitute the purposeful availment of 
a forum state "if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended 
interaction with residents of the state." Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 
F.3d 883, 890 (6th Or. 2002); Zippo Mfg. Co, v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 
1119, 1126-27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the defendant's decision to conduct 
business via the Internet with Pennsylvania residents constituted purposeful 
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availment). Merely because the Internet is a network of computers which are globally 
connected does not render the Fourteen Amendment moot any more than interstate 
phone lines rendered the purposeful availment requirement irrelevant. As the court 
stated in iAccess: 
It is true that a website may form the basis of personal jurisdiction. Courts 
analyze the level and type of activity conducted on the website in question 
to determine jurisdiction. A passive website that does no more than make 
information available cannot by itself form the basis of jurisdiction. Courts 
require "something more" than a website's existence that indicates the 
defendant purposefully directed its activities in a substantial way toward the 
forum state to find personal jurisdiction. 
iAccess, Inc. v. WEBcard Techs., Inc.. 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1187 (D. Utah 2002). 
The court in iAccess analogized creating a web site to placing a product in the stream 
of commerce: "[cjreating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, 
may be felt nationwide—or even worldwide—but, without more, it is not an act 
purposefully directed toward the forum state." Id. The court reached a similar result 
in Stewart v. Hennesey. noting that "[f]or purposes of specific jurisdiction, the critical 
factor becomes the minimum contacts the website creates with the forum state." 
Stewart v. Hennesey. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1201 (D. Utah 2002). 
D. WHETHER ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IS APPROPRIATE IS NOT BEFORE THE 
COURT 
In her Opposition, Ms. Fenn submits for the first time that she should have been 
allowed to conduct additional discovery. (See, e.g., Opposition at p. 14.) However, 
7 
Ms. Fenn failed to raise this issue in either the trial court or before the Court of 
Appeals. Accordingly, Ms. Fenn has waived this issue. 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal uthe issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles. 2002 UT 48, P 14 (2002) (citing 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). In this case, Ms. 
Fenn did not move the trial court for additional discovery. Mleads filed a Motion to 
Dismiss in response to the Complaint supported by the Declaration of Shay Tyler. As 
noted by the trial court, "[t]he Opposition memorandum [filed by Ms. Fenn in 
response] [was] not supported by affidavit." (Record, p. 84 (emphasis added).) That 
opposition (Record, pp. 53-64) nowhere requested additional discovery or even 
suggested that additional discovery would be appropriate. Because Ms. Fenn failed to 
present "the issue [of additional discoveiy] to the trial court in such a way that the trial 
court ha[d] an opportunity to rule on th[e] issue," Ms. Fenn failed to preserve the issue 
on appeal. It is fundamentally unfair for Mleads now, for the first time before the 
Utah Supreme Court, to have to defend against claims of what might have been 
discovered. Accordingly, the Court should reject this argument. 
E. SUBJECTING MLEADS TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN UTAH DOES NOT 
COMPORT WITH TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL 
JUSTICE 
The facts of this case are uncontroverted: Ms. Fenn seeks to recover ten dollars 
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($10.00) in statutory damages for a single email that Mleads could not have known 
would have been viewed in Utah. Ms. Fenn has not suffered any personal injuries and 
is not seeking to make herself whole for any injury to her business, person or property. 
The State of Utah's interest is not as strong in this case as it would be if Ms. Fenn 
were seeking to vindicate actual injury. The burden for Mleads to defend against this 
case in Utah is significant when compared to Ms. Fenn's alleged injury. Conferring 
personal jurisdiction based upon a single email offends traditional notions of fair play 
and justice and renders any restrictions on personal jurisdiction illusory. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Ms. Fenn seeks to confer personal jurisdiction on Mleads based upon a single 
email. Mleads did not know Ms. Fenn was a Utah resident nor did Mleads intend for 
any message to be transmitted to any Utah resident. Both the trial court and the Court 
of Appeals came to this conclusion. The evidence in the Record is Mleads did not 
purposefully direct the e-mail in question to any residents of Utah. Accordingly, 
Mleads did not purposefully avail itself to this jurisdiction. Faced with such minimal 
facts, Ms. Fenn seeks to prejudice the court with speculations outside of the Record. 
The Utah Supreme Court is faced with a clear Record and a fundamental legal 
question: whether a single email alone is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. 
Finding personal jurisdiction based upon a single email would overturn decades of due 
process jurisprudence and effectively allow any defendant to be haled into court across 
9 
state lines without meaningful contact to the state. Therefore, Mleads respectfully 
requests the Court reverse the Court of Appeals and restore personal jurisdiction as a 
meaningful bar to being haled into court in a foreign jurisdiction based upon random 
and fortuitous contacts. 
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